India’s Multi-Alignment is Realpolitik Considering Economic Realities
STORIES, ANALYSES, EXPERT VIEWS
According to the Western perception, India is Russia’s only partner besides China. Nothing could be further from the truth, writes Akhil Ramesh (leads the India program at Pacific Forum in Honolulu, Hawaii). Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Brazil, and a host of Sub-Saharan African nations have good ties with Russia, with same or even treaty-level ties with the US.
Ramesh points out that while “India’s balancing act between the US and Russia continues under Modi, but Washington’s ‘us versus them’ approach to foreign affairs also persists……” The US in particular, persists in moral grandstanding for India. “From American diplomatsto think tankers in Washington to a Joe who read the headlines on the front pages of The New York Times and The Washington Post, everyone takes a holier-than-thou approach to New Delhi’s relations with Moscow.”
Economic realities: What is not realised writes Ramesh is that we “no longer live in a unipolar or bipolar world, particularly in the economic sphere. We live in a multipolar, globalised world wherein a chip that powers your microwave machine sources its raw materials from over 15 nations—some allies, some adversaries and many neutral.
“Economic realities make it difficult for nations to jump on bandwagons based on arbitrary values, or, in this case, geopolitical rivalries. Economies that do not have an appetite for war but only for development, look to diplomacy, particularly at the bilateral level. A case in point is Vietnam’s engagement with China. Closer home, see the Indian Army’s 21 rounds of talks with its Chinese counterparts on the border dispute, or in latest news, the Indian business sector approaching the government with requests for joint ventures with Chinese companies. Turkey’s shooting down of a Russian fighter jet did not totally derail its relationship with Russia, ironically expanding bilateral trade."
India’s ‘realpolitik of multi-alignment is not foolishness but a prudent grand strategy’: India, argues Ramesh “may not necessarily want to become a Japan, South Korea, The Philippines or one of the NATO countries to the US. But it is for good reason. India lifts its own weight. Transforming it into a state dependent on another faraway partner for support may not pan out in the 21st century, when realism and restraint drive foreign policy over liberal internationalist idealism.
“……Given India’s security environment, it cannot afford to outsource its security nor rest in complacency as some nations with defence treaties with the US have done. Besides, the political environment in Washington may not encourage that lethargy.”
Experts therefore, cannot dismiss the growing significance of the non-aligned ‘Global South’, particularly in multilateral fora.
In this global environment, “India’s realpolitik of multi-alignment is not foolishness but a prudent grand strategy for the emerging multipolar world order.”
Counter argument: India not strong enough
Rajesh Rajagopalan (professor of International Politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi) disputes Ramesh’s thesis.
“A realist foreign policy should begin with a clear understanding of the distribution of material power, even if this is not always determinate. Such an assessment would suggest that the world is bipolar, not multipolar. India, with a GDP about a fifth of China’s, is not a polar power; neither is Russia, with a GDP that is half of India’s. It’s not clear how India can magically ‘lift its own weight’ given this inequality, especially considering its rather low defence spending."
It is possible that “Indian cleverness will allow it to counter China by itself despite such gross disparities, but it is a risky bet, especially considering that India’s repeated outreach to China since 2014 has borne little fruit. Warning of the possible dangers of this choice, as I did in my essay, appears entirely reasonable.” Partnering with others, argues Rajagopalan “does not mean a formal security alliance like NATO either, but it does mean a greater willingness to focus on security cooperation with willing partners. Any risk arising from this has to be set against the risk of standing alone, especially since India has made that choice in the past and suffered for it.
“The idea that the ‘Global South’ or BRICS+ matter in dealing with India’s China problem is quaint. If anything, they are more likely to partner with the richer, more authentically anti-Western China than India, though they are irrelevant either way. Equally, trade is not a particularly relevant indicator of political futures, as India’s or even the West’s trade relations with China over the last few decades have amply demonstrated. Multi-alignment with a lot of weak partners is like whistling in the dark: it may reduce your trembling but it will not be of much help should you have to face the dragon.”
