India must look beyond Russia

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India must look beyond Russia

India being caught in a policy dilemma is a matter that has South Block struggling. There is a view that India may not be able to ward off the pressure from the West to revise its stance of indirectly supporting Russia. 

Therefore, at the foreign and strategic polity level,  Pranay Kotasthane (chairperson, high tech geopolitics programme, the Takshashila Institution) argues India must look beyond Russia. 

 

What strategic autonomy should mean to India

As the argument goes, a strong relationship with Russia is imperative for India’s strategic autonomy. “According to this view, India picking Russia over the West when presented with a binary choice demonstrates India’s strategic autonomy. Without such demonstrations, it is feared that India will effectively become a pawn in the geopolitical chess games of the West.”

However, “as a fast growing large economy and the world’s second most human resource-rich country, India has sufficient weight and agency that deters others from treating it like a pawn.

“It follows that gaining more strategic autonomy requires growing one’s national power rapidly. And achieving this goal needs partners that have convergent interests, economic and military heft, and non-antagonistic values. In the current geopolitical moment, that would mean the West, and not Russia. As Russia’s relations with China deepen, the India-Russia relationship will have even less bearing on India’s strategic autonomy. To side with Russia just for the sake of proving one’s independent credentials is the precise opposite of strategic autonomy.”

 

Russia no longer as supportive as in the past

The second reason for maintaining strong ties with Russia “relies on the erstwhile Union of Soviet Socialist Republic’s (USSR) — and later, Russia’s — support to India in the past.  In recent times however,  “Russia has backed the Taliban in Afghanistan and collaborated with Pakistan and China, while the Indian government continued to support the legitimate Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Most importantly, Russia’s reliability is under serious question going ahead as it becomes a much weaker partner, heavily dependent on India’s foremost adversary — China.

 

Military dependency

The third reason is military dependency.  This cannot be discounted informally considering a 62% dependence of the Indian armed forces.

But argues Kotasthane, “some items, such as spares for the T-72 tanks are substitutable as there are other suppliers. Besides, a whole global arms equipment market exists, with multiple sellers and repairers. Russia should be seen as a chosen vendor and not a benefactor for such substitutable equipment.”

But reversing India’s stand on some not so easily substitutable elements, is a challenge.  These are “top of the line S-400 surface-to-air missile system, the planned lease of two nuclear-powered submarines, and the collaboration on the BrahMos cruise missiles are some examples. Besides the equipment, Russia has also been more open to technology transfers. Reversing India’s stance on such systems requires a significant change, not just in India’s calculations, but also in the attitude of the United States. The cooperation on nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS arrangement shows that the West is finally willing to share sensitive technologies with partners to counter China. It is thus in the West’s interest to apply this new technology alliance mindset to India. As more options become available, India will find it easier to reduce its dependence on Russia.”

Kotasthane concludes “the military dependency argument cannot be set aside easily. However, it should not be used as a veto to constrain India’s options on key geopolitical questions. The world order is changing fast. Inertia and over-reliance on older models are no longer the best guides for the future.”

 

India must review ties with Moscow

Nevertheless, India’s shrinking set of choices is palpable, writes Harsh V Pant (director, studies, and head, strategic studies programme, ORF). “Strategically, India cannot afford to be distracted as its focus should be on China. But this war has only reinforced the underlying trends in Indian foreign policy — Indian defence dependence on Russia is unsustainable; India-Russia ties lack breadth; the Russia-China axis is only likely to grow stronger, and India’s ties with the West will continue to grow. Even as India continues with its balancing act, it should be prepared for an eventual rupture with Russia that is bound to happen sooner rather than later despite the best intentions of Indian policymakers and the lure of discounted oil. If the Ukraine war can bring about this clarity in Delhi, it would position India to better deal with the emerging global order.’

Meanwhile, writes  G Parthasarathy (Chancellor, Jammu Central University & former High Commissioner to Pakistan)  “India will continue to cooperate with the US in Quad on security and other challenges posed by China. The last meeting of Quad spelt out areas in which India, Japan, the US and Australia will cooperate. These issues range from vaccines produced in India to greater maritime and military cooperation across the Indo-Pacific.”

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