India - China: Key Aspects of the Relationship
STORIES, ANALYSES, EXPERT VIEWS
External affairs minister Jaishankar, in recent speeches, has done some plain speaking on India’s ties with its neighbours China, Pakistan and Bangladesh.
According to The Tribune it is “debatable if the country’s top diplomat had to speak out like this. The point is being abrasive about relationships in public is not going to change anything while airing frank opinions will probably harm the prospects of diplomacy to heal the wounds that are bedevilling India’s hopes of living in peace where its economic heft is adding to its stature when seen from far beyond the South Asian neighbourhood.”
While “no amount of tough talking is likely to alter the Pakistan Army’s policy of exporting terror to Jammu & Kashmir….China’s intransigence on the border and its clever diplomacy in solving a part of the problem that strategically suited it most through talks after the Galwan clashes of 2020 is too well-known.”
Trade deficit: The foreign minister mentioned the trade deficit problem which, at $41.88 billion in trade of $50.4 bn (January to June 2024 figures), that makes China India’s largest trade deficit partner. This deficit, writes the paper “is particularly worrying since most of it is owing to the import of industrial products to make which India may have the knowhow but not the advantages that enterprise backed by the state of China gives by way of support and subsidies.”
INS Arighaat message: In security terms, the commissioning of INS Arighaat, India’s second nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, marks an important step towards boosting the country’s naval prowess and nuclear deterrence capabilities. India is keen to bolster its N-triad, comprising weapons on land, in the air and at sea. “This is understandable……In terms of operational nuclear warheads, China (500) is way ahead of India (172)……” Nevertheless, “the presence of INS Arighaat is expected to send out a strong message to China that India is not to be trifled with in the seas.”
Two contradictory features in bilateral relations
While government-to-government (G2G) discussions on the border issue have been going on, Sanjaya Baru (political commentator and policy analyst) points to two contradictory features that “have come to define the state of India-China relations. One the one hand, business-to-business (B2B) relations are thriving. Bilateral trade is booming and the Union government’s annual Economic Survey has suggested that India should be more open to Chinese investments. What has suffered most as a consequence of President Xi’s ill-advised move in June 2020 is people-to-people (P2P) contacts. While Beijing has resumed the issue of tourist and business visas, New Delhi remains stingy on both counts and direct flights remain suspended, raising the cost of travel.”
In the circumstance, “both the BJP and the Congress Party should take relations with both the United States and China out of domestic political rivalry and agree to a shared approach. Every government has its share of achievements and mistakes in foreign policy…..We seek the emergence of a multipolar world and a multipolar Asia. That can happen only when the Indian economy is bigger, more productive and dynamic.” And “both the US and China can play a role in the revitalisation of the Indian economy. There is already a political consensus in India among major political parties on the positive role that the US can play in India’s economic rise. There is a similar need for a consensus on the China policy….”
Tibet: India’s patience need to be replaced with building leverage and deterrence
On Tibet, many experts want India to take a tougher line in view of Beijing’s intransigence on the border. India, writes Political analyst Maj Gen Ashok K Mehta (Retd) “is not uttering the ‘T’ word, hoping that a leaders’ summit can lead to full disengagement in eastern Ladakh. Indian restraint and patience need to be replaced with building leverage and deterrence.
“…..The time is ripe for New Delhi to revive the case for Tibet’s full autonomy as a lever against China to settle the border issue. India has stopped saying that the ‘Tibet Autonomous Region is a part of China’ since 2010. But India needs to strengthen its Tibet stance at home and internationally. It is time to reactivate the All-Party Indian Parliamentary Forum for Tibet to start a discussion on the region and the Dalai Lama succession issue in Parliament. Restlessness among Tibetan youth in Dharamsala is growing over the succession to the 14th Dalai Lama in view of internal contradictions.”
India, suggests Mehta “needs to revitalise its contact and protocol arrangements with the Dalai Lama,” particularly on his succession. “It is imperative that the Indian government discuss the succession issue with the Dalai Lama so that Beijing does not preempt his appointment.”
