India - China: Jaishankar, Wang Yi Meet

STORIES, ANALYSES, EXPERT VIEWS

India - China: Jaishankar, Wang Yi Meet

Ahead of the SCO summit, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar Thursday, conveyed to his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi that progress in the disengagement process in eastern Ladakh was essential for restoration of peace and tranquillity and that it is the basis for the development of overall ties.

Jaishankar clarified China must not view India through the lens of its ties with other countries.

Both officials discussed the ongoing impasse at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh which they said had left relations at a “low ebb”. A statement issued after the meeting, held two months after they last met in Dushanbe at the SCO Foreign Minister’s meeting in July, said the Ministers agreed to more talks by military and diplomatic officials to resolve the “remaining issues on disengagement”.

“Both sides had agreed that a prolongation of the existing situation was not in the interest of either side as it was impacting the relationship in a negative manner. EAM therefore emphasised that the two sides should work towards early resolution of the remaining issues along the LAC in Eastern Ladakh while fully abiding by bilateral agreements and protocols,” a Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) statement issued Friday said.

According to the MEA, Jaishankar once again stressed that peace and tranquillity along the LAC, that depends on resolving all remaining issues of the 17-month-long standoff, was an “essential basis” for progress in bilateral relations, but it is understood the two Ministers did discuss global developments, including Afghanistan, during their talks.

Jaishankar said that “Asian solidarity” depended on the example set by India-China relations and in a possible reference to growing U.S.-India ties, added that China should “avoid viewing our bilateral relations from the perspective of its relations with third countries”. The remarks are significant as Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who is addressing the SCO via videoconference on Friday, is travelling to Washington next week to attend the Quad summit with leaders of U.S., Australia and Japan, where their common position on China’s actions in the Indo-Pacific will be watched most closely.

 

‘Moving towards de-escalation’

A statement from China’s Foreign Ministry in Beijing quoted Wang as saying that communication between the Foreign Ministries and militaries of both sides, in addressing the LAC issue, had been “effective” and that the situation was moving in the direction of “de-escalation”. He said China hoped India would “move in the same direction” and push for a stabilisation of the situation and “gradually move from emergency response toward regular management and control”.

“We should consolidate the achievements of disengagement and strictly abide by the agreements and common understanding reached between the two countries,” he said, adding that both countries as two major economies “should continue to adhere to the strategic consensus of not posing a threat to each other and treating each other as opportunities for development”.

The meeting between the Foreign Minister’s came two days after the Chief of Defence Staff Bipin Rawat said that India must prepare to deal with its “adversaries” on both fronts: with China and Pakistan. He had also called China’s moves on Afghanistan, and “making friends” with Iran and Turkey, a “jointmanship between the Sinic and Islamic civilisations”, and asked whether that could lead to a “clash of civilisations” with the West.

Apparently contradicting the CDS’s comments, Jaishankar told Mr. Wang that India did not believe in the “clash of civilisations theory” (famously propounded by U.S. academic Samuel Huntington). “EAM conveyed that India had never subscribed to any clash of civilisations theory. He said that India and China had to deal with each other on merits and establish a relationship based on mutual respect.” the MEA statement said.

 

13th round of military talks due

Indian and Chinese officials are due to hold the 13th round of military talks to resolve the situation at the LAC that began in April last year, when China amassed its troops along the boundary in Eastern Ladakh and transgressed into several areas, leading to the Galwan clash in which 20 Indian soldiers and at least 4 Chinese died.

Of those areas, the two sides completed disengagement of troops in the Galwan Valley, both banks of Pangong Tso and Gogra, but friction points remain to be resolved at Hot Springs, Demchok and Depsang. Both sides have, for the first time, put in place temporary “buffer zones” to avoid further clashes.

 

Jaishankar meets Russian and Iranian counterparts

Friday, Jaishankar held a “useful discussion” with his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov on contemporary issues, including Afghanistan and shared perspectives on global affairs with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, as he held separate informal meetings with the two leaders.

Jaishankar met the two leaders in the Tajik capital on the sidelines of a key summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) on the situation in Afghanistan.

 

Relations are at their lowest ebb: China pushing India to the west

India-China relations are at their lowest ebb in living memory, writes Shashi Tharoor (third-term Member of Parliament representing Thiruvananthapuram and an award-winning author of 22 books, including most recently, The Battle of Belonging).

“To be sure, there have always been political tensions even before, both over each country’s territorial claims over land controlled by the other, and over such long-term problems as China’s “all-weather” alliance with our hostile separated sibling, Pakistan, and our hospitality to the Dalai Lama, who was granted refuge when he fled Tibet in 1959. But neither country had allowed these tensions to overwhelm them….”

India too “has usually shown no desire to rock the boat. Its actions and statements have usually been designed not to provoke our northern neighbour, but to relegate the border problem to the back burner while enabling trade relations with China (now worth close to $100 billion) to flourish. India made it clear that it was unwilling to join in any United States-led ‘containment’ of China; its traditional obsession with preserving its ‘strategic autonomy’….…”

In October 2019 in Mahabalipuram, at their 18th meeting in nine years, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi had grandly pledged to take relations between their two countries to “greater heights”. To mark the 70th anniversary of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries, they announced they would conduct 70 joint activities. Indeed, the  two countries had indeed developed multiple avenues of engagement.

China’s long tern strategy: But, emphasis Tharoor  “it has become increasingly apparent that the policy of side-stepping contentious issues and encouraging bilateral economic relations has played into Chinese hands…… In the Galwan clash, the Chinese troops seem to have been engaged in a tactical move to advance their positions along areas of the LAC that it covets, in order to threaten Indian positions and interdict patrols. After the recent incursions, the Chinese now reportedly control over 900 square kilometres of area in Ladakh along the LAC. They are threatening India’s construction of roads, bridges and similar infrastructure on undisputed Indian territory, a belated effort to mirror similar Chinese efforts near the LAC in Tibet. Rather than merely patrolling, they have established a fixed presence in these areas well beyond China’s own ‘Claim Line’, occupied the ‘Finger Heights’ near Pangong Tso Lake, pitched hundreds of tents, constructed concrete structures and built additional kilometres of road along the LAC. The objective seems to be to extend Chinese troop presence to the intersection of the Galwan river and the Shyok river, which would make the Galwan Valley off bounds to India. The Chinese have constructed permanent structures in the area of their intrusion and issued statements claiming that sovereignty over the Galwan valley has ‘always belonged’ to China.

“China’s strategy seems to be to consolidate the LAC where it wants it, so that an eventual border settlement — that takes these new realities into account — will be in its favour. That is the longer-term plan: Beijing keeps saying the border should be left to future generations to settle, knowing full well that each passing year increases China’s relative economic, military and geopolitical strength vis-à-vis India, while shifting the LAC in its favour. In the meantime, border incidents keep the Indians off balance……..”

India’s limited options: India’s tactical options, writes Tharoor “are unenviable: it has reinforced its military assets on the LAC to prevent deeper incursions for now, and hopes to press the Chinese to restore the status quo ante through either diplomatic or military means…..

Economic dependence: “India has responded with largely symbolic acts of economic retaliation, banning Chinese apps in India on grounds of data security……..Yet, India is far too dependent on China for other vital imports — such as pharmaceuticals, and even the active ingredients to make them, automotive parts and microchips, all needed by Indian manufacturers — that many in New Delhi fear it would be shooting itself in the foot if it acted too strongly against China. Today, India’s dependence on China for its non-consumption economy remains high; what is more, imports from China have become indispensable for India’s exports to the rest of the world. Various manufacturing inputs, industrial equipment and components, and even some technological know-how come from China; eliminating them could have a seriously negative effect on India’s economic growth at a time when, thanks mainly to the COVID-19 crisis, our GDP is estimated to have shrunk dramatically. And there are limits to the effectiveness of any Indian retaliation: trade with China may seem substantial from an Indian perspective, but it only represents 3% of China’s exports. Drastically reducing it would not be enough to deter Beijing or cause it to change its behaviour.”

Realistically therefore, there are  “only two strategic options for New Delhi: reconciling itself to playing second fiddle to an assertive China in the region, or seeking strength and leverage by aligning itself with a broader international coalition against Chinese ambitions. Since the first is indigestible for any democracy, is China de facto pushing India into doing something it has always resisted — allying with the West?”


All Neighbours Article